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Abstract
Background: In species across taxa, offspring have means to influence parental investment (PI). PI thus evolves as an
interacting phenotype and indirect genetic effects may strongly affect the co-evolutionary dynamics of offspring and
parental behaviors. Evolutionary theory focused on explaining how exaggerated offspring solicitation can be understood as
resolution of parent-offspring conflict, but the evolutionary origin and diversification of different forms of family interactions
remains unclear.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In contrast to previous theory that largely uses a static approach to predict how
‘‘offspring individuals’’ and ‘‘parental individuals’’ should interact given conflict over PI, we present a dynamic theoretical
framework of antagonistic selection on the PI individuals obtain/take as offspring and the PI they provide as parents to
maximize individual lifetime reproductive success; we analyze a deterministic and a stochastic version of this dynamic
framework. We show that a zone for equivalent co-adaptation outcomes exists in which stable levels of PI can evolve and be
maintained despite fast strategy transitions and ongoing co-evolutionary dynamics. Under antagonistic co-adaptation, cost-
free solicitation can evolve as an adaptation to emerging preferences in parents.
Conclusions/Significance: We show that antagonistic selection across the offspring and parental life-stage of individuals
favors co-adapted offspring and parental behavior within a zone of equivalent outcomes. This antagonistic parent-offspring
co-adaptation does not require solicitation to be costly, allows for rapid divergence and evolutionary novelty and
potentially explains the origin and diversification of the observed provisioning forms in family life.
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Introduction
Offspring influences on parental investment (PI) are ubiquitous [1–
4]. For instance, mammal and plant embryos release hormones to
sequester resources from maternal tissues [5,6], insect juveniles emit
chemical cues to which caregivers respond [7–9], and bird chicks
display their characteristic begging displays (calling, wing-flapping)
and morphologies (gapes, ornamental plumage [10,11]). The
evolution of offspring characters that influence PI is traditionally
understood as the phenotypic, and usually costly, manifestation of
resolvedconflictbetweenparentsandtheiroffspringoverPI[1–4,12],
driven either by sibling rivalry [13] or parental preference [14]. The
major predictions of conflict resolution theory have received
experimental support overall [e.g., 12,15], but it is also becoming
increasingly clear that it does not capture a number of critical aspect
in the co-evolution of offspring and parental behaviors [15]. A
repeatedly mentioned shortcoming of this theory [15–21] is its static
approach of modeling how ‘‘offspring individuals’’ and ‘‘parental
individuals’’ should interact given conflict [but see; 22,23].
Quantitative genetic models of maternal effects and parent-
offspring interactions represent an alternative approach focusing
on the maintenance of heritable (co-)variation by modeling how
offspring and parent behaviors interact to determine offspring (or
parental) fitness [19,24–26]. This approach makes predictions for
patterns of co-adaptation in terms of genetic correlations between
offspring and parental traits based on selection acting on offspring
or on parents, but it has not yet been incorporated into an explicit
functional context for PI [27].
Here, we develop a dynamic evolutionary model based on co-
evolving behavioral reaction norms [27,28] and the premise of
antagonistic selection on the amount of PI individuals obtain/take as
offspring and the PI they provide as parents. This model is evaluated
both deterministically and stochastically. Antagonistic selection occurs
because, under a trade-off between the number and quality of
offspring [29,30], obtained PI enhances survival of individuals when
they are offspring, but provided PI per offspring reduces fecundity of
individuals when they are parents. We show that this antagonistic
selection across life-stages generates a neutral space of equivalent co-
adapted strategy sets individualsm a ye x p r e s sa so f f s p r i n ga n da s
parents. This outcome allows for evolutionary innovation in family
interactions by maintaining cryptic heritable variation and ongoing
evolutionary dynamics in the behaviors mediating PI.
The Model
We developed a co-adaptation model using both a deterministic
analysis and stochastic simulations of antagonistic selection across
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parameters and variables. The model assumes a trade-off between
quality (survival) and number (fecundity) of offspring [29,30],
which necessarily implies that the amount of PI individuals obtain
as an offspring tightly co-evolves with the amount provided as a
parent (at equilibrium they have to be identical). In our model,
selection on the offspring stage of generation t does not affect
parental traits (generation t21) because these individuals belong to
different generations. Selection does however favor increased
solicitation x in the offspring stage, which will increase the amount
of obtained PI (fo) if, and only if, parents are sensitive. Conversely,
selection on the parental stage of generation t can favor a
reduction of provided PI (fp) in two ways: 1) by reducing the
sensitivity a of a parent to offspring solicitation, or 2) by reducing a
baseline amount b of PI. Differential selection on these two
components of provided PI depends on the level of solicitation
expressed in the offspring stage of generation t+1.
Critically, a successful offspring solicitation strategy increases its
representation in the parental stage of the current generation, but
has yet to spread to the next generation. Thus, the spread of
solicitation strategy x also depends on how the individual performs
as a parent in terms of its fecundity and, hence, its sensitivity a and
baseline PI b (Figure 1). Obviously, solicitation is not directly
expressed during the parental life-stage, but, if the individual
becomesa parentwho issensitiveto offspringsolicitation, thereisan
indirect genetic effect [31] of solicitation on fp [32] generating
intergenomic (‘‘social’’) epistasis for fitness between offspring and
parents [25,33,34]. Analogously, parental provisioning genes,
despite only being expressed during the parental stage, must survive
the offspring stage before they generate a fecundity pay-off during
the stage at which they are expressed (Figure 1). Their evolutionary
success depends on an interaction with the solicitation strategy x
inherited to the offspring, to which they are also predictably
associated within an individual (or genome). In summary,
solicitation and provisioning co-evolve as interacting phenotypes
[31], generate intergenomic (‘‘social’’) epistasis for fitness [25,33,34]
and are under antagonistic selection across life-stages.
We assume throughout that a single parent interacts with a
single offspring or, equivalently, with an arbitrary number of
offspring that do not interact or compete. At evolutionary
equilibrium, population means for fo and fp (wo and wp
respectively), as mediated by the interaction of mean levels for
solicitation j, sensitivity a and baseline provisioning b, must be
identical (^ w wo~^ w wp). This equilibrium level of obtained/provided PI
is denoted by ^ w w (Table 1).
Deterministic Model
The survival during the offspring stage in relation to fo of
individuals from target generation t is determined by a diminishing
returns function like in traditional life-history and conflict
resolution models [3,4,12,29]. Specifically,
Sf o,t ðÞ ~
fo,t{pmin
fo,t{pminzk
H(fo,t{pmin) ð1Þ
where pmin is the minimal PI necessary for offspring survival and k
is a ‘shape parameter’ determining the marginal returns on PI
(Table 1). The Heaviside function (H) is a standard step-function
used to set survival to zero if fo:tvpmin (i.e., to prevent negative
fitness values). An important aspect of our model is that solicitation
has no direct fitness cost during the offspring stage.
If an individual of target generation t survived the offspring
stage, fecundity during the parental stage was defined as a decay
function depicting a fecundity cost of increased provided PI
Ff p,t
  
~
m
fp,t
, ð2Þ
where m is a fixed amount of resources available for lifetime
Table 1. Definitions of functions, model parameters and
variables.
Variable/
Parameter Definition
General
fo Amount of PI obtained as offspring
fp Amount of PI provided as parent to each offspring
w Population mean amount of PI
t Time index, in generations (tRfocal generation)
S() Offspring survival function
F() Parental fecundity function
W() Lifetime individual fitness function
H() Heaviside function (step-function to set survival to 0 if fo,pmin)
pmin Minimum amount of PI required for offspring survival (fitness
parameter)
k Shape parameter for offspring survival function (fitness
parameter)
m Total PI available for reproduction (fitness parameter)
a Parental sensitivity to offspring solicitation (evolving trait)
x Offspring solicitation level (evolving trait)
b Baseline level of PI (evolving trait)
Deterministic model
a,j,b,w Population means (non-equilibrium) for parental sensitivity,
offspring solicitation, baseline PI and total PI, respectively
^ a a,^ j j,^ b b,^ w w Equilibrium population means for sensitivity, solicitation,
baseline PI and total PI, respectively
a0,j0,b0 Initial values (generation 0) for population mean sensitivity,
solicitation and baseline PI, respectively, in numerical analyses
Stochastic simulation
aj Sensitivity alleles 1–5 (stochastic simulations); a1Rinsensitive
xi Solicitation alleles 1–5 (stochastic simulations); x1Rno
solicitation
bconst Baseline provided PI; fixed parameter
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.t001
Figure 1. Transmission dynamics of provisioning genes (blue
boxes) and solicitation genes (red boxes). Filled boxes indicate
the gene is expressed in that life-stage, hatched boxes that the gene in
not expressed. Arrows depict the path through which genes get passed
on to the next generation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g001
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obtainedPIaffectsonlyoffspring survival,notthe resourcesavailable
for reproduction when the individual becomes a parent. See Figure 2
for a graphical illustration of the fitness model and its components.
We used a quantitative genetic model of trait expression,
incorporating the cross-generational interaction between parents
and their offspring as an indirect genetic effect [31,35] mediated
by an evolving linear behavioral reaction norm [27]. The standard
assumptions of quantitative genetic models apply (normally
distributed trait values, random mating, constant additive genetic
(co-)variances, and weak selection). We focused on the directional
selection driving antagonistic co-adaptation in terms of evolving
population mean levels of offspring solicitation and parental
provisioning. Non-linear selection affects the genetic variances and
co-variances, an aspect studied in previous co-adaptation models
[24,25], but it has no direct effect on evolving mean trait values
[36] and thus was not included in the present analyses.
For simplicity, we assume PI responds linearly to solicitation
according to linear behavioral reaction norms [27,28]: fo,t=at21 xt
+bt21 and fp,t=at xt+1+bt (subscripts t21 and t+1 refer to the
previous and subsequent generation, respectively). To ensure
behavioral stability and convergence of interacting offspring and
parental behavioral reaction norms [37], and for tractability, we
assume that a strategic change in provisioning has fitness
consequences for, but no behavioral effect on, solicitation.
Fitness was calculated over both life-stages as the product of
survival at the offspring stage and fecundity at the parental stage
(i.e., W=S6F).
W~S(fo,t)|F(fp,t)
~
fo,t{pmin
fo,t{pminzk
|
m
fp,t
|H(fo,t{pmin)
~
fo,t{pmin
fo,t{pminzk
|
m
fp,t
|H(fo,t{pmin)
and
fo,t~at{1xtzbt{1~at{1xtzbt{1
~(at{Da)xtz(bt{Db)
and
fp,t~at
(xtzjt)
2
zbt
ð3Þ
where Greek versions of letters reflect the population mean for a
trait, and the D notation indicates the evolutionary change
between generations t21 and t. In order to get equation 3 we
assume random mating, traits are additively inherited, that
provisioning is performed uniparentally and the offspring is the
caring parent’s progeny. To calculate the average fitness function
{   W W, we assumed that the per generation changes in baseline
provisioning and parental sensitivity are small relative to the mean
values of these traits (i.e., bt{Db&bt and at{Da&at).
Using the fitness function (W) from equation 3, we calculated
the evolutionary dynamics of the system using the standard
machinery of quantitative genetics [36]. In particular, we analyzed
the dynamic system _ u u~G+u ln{   W Wt – where _ u u is the time derivative
of u which is the trait vector {a, j, b} and +u is the gradient
operator – for equilibria and their stability. A first-order Taylor
series approximation of W about the point wt, the mean of fo,t
(equation 1), was used to compute the average fitness function
{   W Wt~
wt{pmin
wt{pminzk
|
m
wt
|H(wt{pmin) ð4Þ
Because the evolutionary system is a gradient system, the single
fitness maximum at ^ w w (Figure 2C) is an evolutionarily stable
equilibrium of the system [36].
The time-dynamics of the system were numerically explored.
Initial values for population mean parental sensitivity a0, offspring
begging j0, and baseline provisioning b0 for a starting population
of interacting offspring and their parents were chosen such that the
resulting level of PI was not too far from the equilibrium (62 units
of PI). This choice was made due to convergence problems when
the dynamic system was started with more extreme values, and our
analyses is therefore not for global stability (rather for an
‘attraction basin’); in practice, the only circumstance under which
the system did not converge was when one of the three
provisioning traits evolved to zero prior to achieving equilibrium,
which was more likely to happen for extreme starting values.
Numerical analyses were carried out using the software MATHE-
MATICA (v. 6.0) [38].
Stochastic Simulations
To address the role of stochastic effects in the antagonistic co-
adaptation process, we developed a stochastic, numerical analogue
of our deterministic model that explicitly incorporated mutation,
Figure 2. Fitness model used throughout. Panel A depicts how survival S is determined by the amount of obtained parental investment (fo,t) (for
different shape parameters k), B how parental fecundity F changes with the amount of provided PI (fp,t) (for different total resources available for
reproduction; parameter m), and C how individual lifetime fitness W changes in relation to PI when fo=fp and for different values of k.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g002
[4]
[3]
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set up as a discrete-time Monte Carlo simulation model in which
each event (survival, reproduction and death) occurred probabi-
listically. Offspring solicitation and parental sensitivity were
represented by two distinct loci with alleles determining the
corresponding levels of behavior. We assumed solicitation (x) was
governed by one locus with i alleles and parental sensitivity (a)b y
one locus with j alleles. We assumed equal allele numbers for the
two loci, and present the results for i=j=5 (qualitatively similar
results were obtained with different allele numbers; SG and MK
unpublished results). The baseline provisioning bconst was incorpo-
rated as a fixed parameter in the stochastic simulations. To parallel
the analytical version of our model, we assumed PI responds
linearly to solicitation. Each offspring genotype xi expressed a
different level of solicitation, the lowest (x1) always being ‘‘no
solicitation’’; similarly, each parental genotype aj expressed a
different level of sensitivity to solicitation, the lowest (a1) always
being ‘‘no sensitivity’’. The highest level (x5) for an allele was
calculated as the one that, combined with the highest parental
sensitivity (a5), would result in the upper limit for PI available to
parents (parameter m). Alleles for intermediate solicitation levels
(x2–x4) and intermediate sensitivity levels (a22a4) were chosen to be
evenly distributed between the minimum and maximum values.
We assumed a population composed of n/2 families (i.e., parent-
offspring interactions) where n is the population size in terms of
individuals present at any given moment in time; each family was
composed of one parent and one offspring (i.e., individuals from
successive generations). Individuals in a given life-stage have
discrete and non-overlapping generations, but interact across life-
stages and generations to determine PI. We further assumed the
individuals are haploid and reproduce asexually. The haploid
mode of inheritance was chosen for its simplicity. Nevertheless, it
directly relates to the assumed additive mode of inheritance in the
analytical version of the model because the expressed genetic
variance under haploid inheritance is caused by additive
components only [39, p. 92] (except for within-genomic epistatic
interactions). To avoid some of the pitfalls of asexual reproduction
in such simulations (e.g., lock-in of sub-optimal genotypes due to
lack of genetic variability and sexual recombination), a relatively
high mutation rate was chosen. Mutations caused a change of
allelic state to another allele within the set of possible alleles. The
mean6SE per-generation mutation rates over 1000 time-steps
were 0.100460.0002 and 0.0987360.0002 for the solicitation and
sensitivity locus, respectively. The mutation rate was not supposed
to reflect a biologically realistic rate, but rather to continuously
regenerate heritable variation for parental sensitivity and offspring
solicitation on which antagonistic selection could act in the
absence of sexual recombination.
Similar to the analytical model, the success of an individual in
generation t was the product of its survival S at the offspring stage
and its fecundity F at the parent stage (see Table 1). Generation t
was composed of two time-steps T in the simulation model
(t=2T), reflecting an offspring and parental life stage, respectively.
The frequency of the solicitation genotype xi in the offspring
subpopulation was computed at each time step T. Offspring
survival/death happened with a likelihood proportional to S(fo,t).
Specifically, the survival probability of an offspring carrying
solicitation allele xi obtaining PI from its parent with sensitivity
allele aj, was given by
Sf o,t ðÞ ~
xi,taj,t{1zbconst
  
{pmin
xi,taj,t{1zbconst
  
{pminzk
Hx i,taj,t{1zbconst
  
{pmin
  
,
where xi,taj,t{1zbconst
  
corresponds to the amount of obtained PI
(fo,t). See table 1 for variable and parameter definitions. An
offspring survived in the simulations if the value for S(fo,t) was
larger than a random number drawn from a uniform distribution.
Equivalently, reproduction happened with a likelihood propor-
tional to F(fp,t) the fecundity of a parent carrying sensitivity allele aj
that provides PI to its offspring with solicitation allele xi. The
frequency of the parental sensitivity genotype aj in the offspring
sub-population of individuals from the next generation (t+1) was
assumed to evolve according to
Ff p,t
  
~
m
xi,tz1aj,tzbconst
  
where xi,tz1aj,tzbconst
  
corresponds to provided PI (fp,t)a s
determined by the interaction of the sensitivity allele aj,t of the focal
generation individuals in their parental stage, and the solicitation
genotype of their offspring (xi,t+1,). As before for survival, a parent
reproduced if the value for F(fp,t) was larger than a random number
drawn from a uniform distribution.
The population was assumed to be of constant size (in the
examples shown, the population size n was equal 1000). To
prevent population extinction we incorporated a stochastic
immigration process that compensated for offspring mortality
and reproductive failure. The genotypes of immigrant individuals
were assumed to occur at a likelihood proportional to the genotype
frequencies present in the resident population (i.e., we assumed
that only genotypes similar to the ones established could
successfully immigrate).
To test the prediction that the evolved offspring solicitation
strategy should depend on the evolved parental sensitivity strategy
(expressed during the adult stage), we ran simulations with fixed
parental sensitivity strategies (a12a5). To test stochastic influences
for the evolution offspring solicitation and parental sensitivity, we
ran simulations where offspring solicitation and parental sensitivity
could both mutate and co-evolve. All simulations started with no
genetic variability in the population; specifically all individuals
carried the non-soliciting allele (x1) for the offspring strategy and
the insensitive allele (a1) for the parental strategy. We used an
experimental design with 100 replicate simulations per sensitivity
level, and 1000 time steps (500 generations) per run.
Model Results
Deterministic model. In this model, {   W W(equation 4) has
one fitness-maximizing equilibrium with respect to PI at
^ w w~pminz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
kpmin
p
, which was found by setting
L{   W W
Lw
~0 and
solving for w. This equilibrium can be shown to always be at least
neutrally stable with respect to population means for parental
sensitivity a, offspring solicitation j and baseline provisioning b,
such that
^ w w~pminz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
kpmin
p
and
w~ajzb
: ::^ a a^ j jz^ b b~pminz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
kpmin
p
:
ð5Þ
This equilibrium defines combinations of parental sensitivity,
baseline provisioning and offspring solicitation within individuals
(genomes) due to antagonistic selection across life-stages, and we
refer to it as a co-adaptation equilibrium (Figure 3). It can be
further shown by numerical analysis that the dynamic system
[5]
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structure of the genetic covariance matrix, i.e., also in the presence
of genetic correlations between a, x and b (an analytical proof is
available upon request as well).
The numerical analysis of the deterministic system was carried
out systematically with parameter values pmin=2,k=2.5, m=10,
yielding an optimum level for ^ w w of approximately 4.2361. These
are the same parameter values as those used in our stochastic
simulations (see below). Different sets of genetic variances and
genetic correlations among the traits were explored, with initial
values (t=0) for each trait (a0, j0, b0) , genetic variances for, and
correlations among traits chosen at random to numerically explore
the stability of the co-adaptation equilibrium for different genetic
covariance matrices. In all cases, the system evolved to the
expected value for ^ w w of 4.2361, irrespective of the genetic variances
and correlations among the traits. This result holds for many more
conditions of covariance matrices and initial trait values (BJR and
MK unpublished results) as long as none of the three trait values
evolved to zero prior to achieving equilibrium, a condition causing
convergence problems.
Stochastic Simulations
Based on the results of the analytical model (Figure 3), we
predicted that 1) successful invasion and maintenance of offspring
solicitation strategies should be critically determined by the
provisioning strategy (sensitivity) expressed at the parental stage
of the individuals in a population (co-adaptation), and 2) stochastic
effects may lead to transitions in offspring solicitation and parental
provisioning strategies within the limits set by the co-adaptation
equilibrium without altering PI (neutral curve). Thus, a stable level
of PI should be maintained despite ongoing changes at the genetic
level for solicitation and sensitivity.
The first prediction was tested in simulations where the parental
allele was fixed at different levels of sensitivity (a12a5), and the
solicitation locus was allowed to evolve and adapt to the fixed
parental sensitivity. As predicted, the successful spread of different
offspring solicitation strategies depended on the particular fixed
sensitivity allele present in the parental stage of individuals of the
population (ANOVA: interaction sensitivity allele x solicitation
allele, F16,2475=224.43, p,0.001; Figure 4). With insensitive
parents, offspring solicitation is selectively neutral in our model
and, correspondingly, solicitation strategies from low to high
emerged and were maintained at low and similar frequencies.
When a sensitive parental provisioning allele was fixed, a
particular solicitation strategy quickly invaded and evolved to
high frequency, but which solicitation allele took over depended
on the parental sensitivity genotype. With high parental sensitivity,
the low-solicitation alleles occurred at higher frequencies; similarly
if parents were less sensitive, then high-solicitation alleles occurred
at greater frequency (Figure 4).
To test the second prediction, offspring and parental strategies
were both allowed to evolve and co-adapt. As expected, co-
evolutionary transitions sometimes occurred after PI reached the
expected optimum (Figure 5B,C), and these transitions were barely
detectable in terms of PI (Figure 5A). To quantitatively show
evolutionary stasis in PI despite ongoing dynamics in offspring
solicitation and parental sensitivity, we compared the coefficients
of variation (C.V.) over time (second half of the simulations=250
generations) between the evolving PI-level and the evolving
solicitation and sensitivity allele-frequencies. The average CV
and 95%-percentiles were computed across the 100 replicate runs.
Figure 3. Co-adaptation equilibrium and neutral stability. In A
the fitness surface displaying the neutral curve for co-adapted
associations of offspring solicitation and parental sensitivity for a fixed
value of b is shown. B illustrates a typical dynamics of the system from
two different sets of initial conditions (solid versus dashed lines). Red
lines are for parental sensitivity a, green lines for offspring solicitation j
and blue lines for the baseline provisioning b; clearly, under different
initial conditions the system reaches different stable equilibria that are
part of the stable equilibrium ‘curve’ in A.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g003
Figure 4. Simulation outcomes with parental sensitivity fixed. a1 represents an insensitive parental strategy, and a5 the most sensitive
parental strategy. The solicitation locus is allowed to mutate among the five alleles and evolve. x1 is a non-soliciting strategy, x5 the highest
solicitation strategy. and adapt to the parental sensitivity present in the parental sub-population. The mean and 95% percentiles of the distribution of
evolutionary outcomes are shown for the frequencies of each solicitation allele after 500 generations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g004
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around 40% variation in solicitation and sensitivity allele-
frequencies (Figure 6). This result confirms that a relatively stable
optimal level of PI can be maintained by a range of co-adapted
offspring and parental strategy sets that are equivalent in terms of
lifetime fitness, just as our analytical result of neutral stability
predicts.
Discussion
Our model demonstrates that antagonistic selection across the
offspring and parental life-stage of individuals favors the
expression of co-adapted strategies that match to maximize an
individual’s lifetime fitness. In our model, offspring solicitation has
no direct cost during the offspring stage and emerges from
arbitrary cues as an adaptation to emerging parental sensitivities
rather than as a resolution of parent-offspring conflict. We propose
that under a trade-off between the number and quality of offspring
(which is well supported experimentally; e.g. [40]) antagonistic co-
adaptation is a critical component shaping offspring and parental
strategies in the evolution of family interactions. It is an
alternative, albeit not mutually exclusive, hypothesis for the
evolution of offspring solicitation focused on co-evolving and
interacting behavioral reaction norms [27], the resulting inter-
genomic epistasis for fitness and the co-adaptation of offspring and
parental strategies within genomes.
The ‘‘possibility of coadaptive evolution’’[16] in parent-
offspring interactions was pointed out for the first time by
Feldmann and Eshel [16], but explicit co-adaptation models were
developed much later [24–26]. These previous co-adaptation
models predict adaptive genetic correlation between offspring and
parental traits due to maternal effects [24] or parent-offspring
interactions [25] leading to the co-inheritance of offspring and
parental behaviors. There is increasing experimental evidence
supporting the prediction for co-inherited offspring and parental
behaviors (see [25,27], but see [41]), which implies that genes
underlying offspring and parental behaviors may often segregate
non-randomly and tend to be co-inherited. These models focused
on the evolution of genetic correlations through linkage disequi-
librium given offspring solicit and parents respond. They assumed
selection to act either on offspring [24–26] or on parents [25], and
that the interaction coefficients were evolutionarily fixed (i.e.,
constant strengths of indirect genetic effects). The present model
differs from these previous co-adaptation models in that it derives
a co-adaptation equilibrium in terms of population mean offspring
and parental behaviors in an explicit functional context of PI (i.e.,
antagonistic selection across life-stages), tests the potential
consequences of genetic correlation on the stability of this
equilibrium and allows the parental behavioral reaction norm to
evolve fully in terms of both sensitivity to solicitation and baseline
provisioning.
The co-adaptation equilibrium ^ w w (equation 5) has several
interesting properties. First, and similar to conflict resolution
models, offspring solicitation, parental sensitivity, and baseline
provisioning depend upon the marginal return on PI in terms of
offspring survival (as determined by k) [4,14]. Second, the genetic
covariance between solicitation and sensitivity do not influence the
equilibrium values for the strategies, and, contrary to expectations
from previous suggestions [33,42,43], do not destabilize the
equilibrium level of PI by, for example, triggering a runaway
process. Third, the co-adaptation equilibrium is actually a ‘curve’
in space (Figure 3A) with many equilibria, including non-soliciting
offspring and insensitive parents. Thus, the actual equilibrium trait
values depend upon initial conditions of the system (Figure 3B)
and, because the equilibrium is neutrally stable, the system can
‘drift’ to different points along the equilibrium curve. If the system
is perturbed after reaching equilibrium it may not return to the
Figure 5. Simulation outcome with offspring solicitation and parental sensitivity co-evolving. Example of a single simulation run. Panel
A) shows the evolution of the population mean level of PI (the dashed red line reflects the theoretical optimum level of PI for the chosen parameter
values). B) the evolving frequencies of the five solicitation alleles, and C) the evolving frequencies of the five sensitivity alleles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g005
Figure 6. Time dynamics in the stochastic simulations. The co-
evolutionary time-dynamics for the level of PI, solicitation allele
frequencies and sensitivity allele frequencies. Shown are the mean
and 95% percentiles for the coefficients of variation (C.V.) calculated
over the final 250 generations and across 100 simulation runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008606.g006
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perturbation (Figure 5). This last result suggests evolutionary
robustness [44] in PI and an important role for stochastic evolu-
tionary processes, such as mutation or migration, and environ-
mental fluctuations facilitating the original evolution of offspring
solicitation and parental sensitivity [15,20]. Such events may
represent instances of evolutionary innovation such as, for
example, the origin of offspring solicitation. Thus, while PI itself
is expected to be robust evolutionarily, the underlying traits used
to mediate its provisioning should be highly labile and maintain
substantial cryptic heritable variation and evolvability ([44,45]; see
also [24,25]). As a result, populations and/or species may diverge
and diversify quickly in how individuals solicit as offspring and
respond as parents [46], despite similar levels of PI.
Thisco-adapted spacearisesbecause itconstitutes‘‘a collectionof
equivalent solutions to the same biological problem’’ [44; p. 195],
the problem being in this case obtaining (as an offspring) and
providing (as a parent) an amount of parental investment which
maximizes lifetime fitness. All else being equal, lifetime fitness can
be the same in rigid investment systems where parents simply
provide an optimal baseline investment (i.e. a~0,j~0,b~^ w w)o r
communicative systems (aw0,jw0,pminƒbv^ w w). Only once par-
ents evolve sensitivity to an otherwise selectively neutral offspring
cue, can the evolution of an offspring signal originate [47]. Parental
sensitivity may emerge purely stochastically as a sensory bias [48]
(like in our model), or as an adaptation if sensitive parents provide
resources more effectively [49,50]. It will be interesting to extend
our model to incorporate a direct benefit to sensitive parental
strategies and a direct cost to offspring solicitation.
We assumed throughout that soliciting is not costly to offspring.
If antagonistic co-adaptation drives the evolution of offspring
solicitation, begging costs during the offspring stage are not
necessary for evolutionary stability, and the evolved (neutrally
stable) solicitation level is determined by the sensitivity expressed
in the parental stage. This stabilizing effect is due to the indirect
genetic effect of solicitation on PI which leads to fecundity losses in
individuals who are sensitive parents [32]. Thus, under antago-
nistic co-adaptation, intense solicitation does not automatically
imply costliness or selfishness, which may help explain why many
offspring cues or signals to which parents respond are subtle in
nature [51], and begging costs to offspring – even for the vigorous
bird begging displays – are often surprisingly low (see [11] and
chapters therein).
The major conclusions of our model are that antagonistic co-
adaptation is the direct consequence of an offspring quality-
quantity trade-off generating selection on both solicitation and
provisioning genes that temporarily share a genome when
expressed in different life-stages of individuals, and interact across
generations in a predictable manner (i.e., as determined by the
degree of genetic relatedness). While our model is on the evolution
of parent-offspring interactions and offspring solicitation, antago-
nistic selection across the offspring and parental life-stage can play
an important role in life-history evolution in general, whenever
trade-offs differentially affect fitness components to the offspring
versus the parental life-stage. For instance, data from a long-term
field study in soay sheep (Ovis aries) showed that selection favored
singleton births at the offspring stage, but twin births at the
parental stage [52]. Considering the consequences of antagonistic
co-adaptation in the evolution of parent-offspring interactions
might change predictions of conflict resolution theory, which
assumed independent segregation of offspring and parental
strategies [3], by, for example, constraining the evolutionary
success of selfish and costly offspring strategies [16,19,32]. One
recently suggested alternative possibility [26] is that different sets
of genes may be shaped by co-adaptation and conflict. Genes
under selection from co-adaptation would ensure the functional
integrity of the parent-offspring interaction over the lifetime of
individuals, while other loci under selection from conflict may lead
to the evolutionary exaggeration of the signals due to a competitive
advantage during the offspring life-stage. In future efforts to unify
the evolutionary theory underlying family interactions, researchers
need to clarify exactly how conflict resolution and co-adaptation
relate to each other [27].
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